The appellant and respondents had formed a partnership called 'Abdullah Chan & Co' ('the firm'). No agreement or deed was entered into by the parties. Subsequently, the relationship between the partners deteriorated and culminated in the appellant issuing a notice of dissolution ('notice') to dissolve the partnership with effect from 31 December 2010. After the issue of the said notice, the first and second respondents applied for leave to practice under the name and style of 'Abdullah Chan' from 2 January 2011 and obtained a court order on 7 February 2011 to this effect. The appellant appealed against the High Court's decision which held that the first and second respondents were at liberty to apply to practice under the name of Messrs "Abdullah Chan'.

Held (allowing appeal with no order as to costs)

Per Zainun Ali JCA delivering the judgment of the court:

(1) The test of whether a partner can use the name of the partnership after the dissolution of the firm depends on whether the goodwill of the partnership has been assigned and not whether the name of the dissolved firm carries the name of the partner who is objecting to the use of the name; Sukhinderjit Singh Muker v. Arumugam Deva Rajah (refd). (para 32)

(2) Generally, the goodwill of the business carried out by a partnership forms part of the assets to be realised on dissolution. Generally too, where the goodwill is not sold, each partner may use the name of the firm, if by doing so, he does not hold out the other partners as still being partners with him. (para 34)

(3) Since there was no agreement between the partners of the dissolved firm of "Abdullah Chan" as to the property in the goodwill attached to the name, the goodwill therefore belonged to all the partners of the dissolved firm of "Abdullah Chan" and not to any one individual partner. Thus, the first and second respondents were not entitled to use the name "Abdullah Chan" for themselves. (paras 37 & 46)

(4) The High Court order of 7 February 2011 which "appropriated" to the first and second respondents, an asset that belonged to all five partners of the dissolved firm of "Abdullah Chan", to the exclusion of the rights of the others, namely the appellant (as well as the third and fourth respondents), offended the principle of "the right of the other partners to have the goodwill sold for the common benefit of all". (paras 47 & 48)

(5) Until and unless the process of the winding-up of the affairs of the partnership was completed, none of the partners were entitled to use the name of their erstwhile partnership. (para 62)

Bahasa Malaysia Translation Of Headnotes

Perayu dan responden-responden membentuk suatu perkongsian yang dikenali sebagai "Abdullah Chan & Co" ('firma tersebut'). Tiada perjanjian atau surat ikatan dimeterai oleh pihak-pihak yang terlibat. Berikutan itu, hubungan antara rakan-rakan kongsi merosot dan berakhir dengan pengeluaran notis pembubaran ('notis') oleh perayu untuk membubarkan perkongsian tersebut berkuatkuasa daripada 31 Disember 2010. Selepas pengeluaran notis tersebut, responden pertama dan kedua memohon kebenaran untuk beramal di bawah nama dan gaya "Abdullah Chan" dari 2 Januari 2011 dan memperolehi perintah mahkamah pada 7 Februari 2011. Perayu merayu terhadap keputusan Mahkamah Tinggi yang memutuskan bahawa responden pertama dan kedua mempunyai kebebasan untuk memohon untuk beramal di bawah nama Tetuan "Abdullah Chan".

Diputuskan (membenarkan rayuan tanpa perintah untuk kos)

Oleh Zainun Ali HMR menyampaikan penghakiman mahkamah:

(1) Ujian sama ada seorang rakan kongsi boleh menggunakan nama perkongsian selepas pembubaran firma tersebut bergantung kepada sama ada nama baik perkongsian tersebut telah diserahhakkan dan bukan sama ada nama firma yang dibubarkan mengandungi nama rakan kongsi yang membantah penggunaan nama tersebut; Sukhinderjit Singh Muker v. Arumugam Deva Rajah (dirujuk).

(2) Secara umumnya nama baik perniagaan yang dijalankan oleh perkongsian membentuk sebahagian aset yang boleh direalisasikan selepas pembubaran. Secara umumnya juga, di mana nama baik tidak dijual, setiap rakan kongsi boleh menggunakan nama firma tersebut, jika dengan berbuat demikian, dia tidak menunjukkan bahawa rakan kongsi yang lain sebagai masih lagi mempunyai perkongsian dengannya.

(3) Oleh kerana tiada perjanjian di antara rakan-rakan kongsi firma yang telah dibubarkan "Abdullah Chan" mengenai harta dalam nama baik yang terikat pada nama tersebut, dengan itu nama baik tersebut kepunyaan kesemua rakan kongsi firma yang dibubarkan "Abdullah Chan" dan bukan kepada mana-mana seorang rakan kongsi secara individu. Oleh itu, responden pertama dan kedua tidak berhak menggunakan nama "Abdullah Chan" untuk diri mereka sendiri.

(4) Perintah Mahkamah Tinggi bertarikh 7 Februari 2011 yang "memperuntukkan" kepada responden pertama dan kedua harta kepunyaan lima rakan kongsi firma "Abdullah Chan" yang dibubarkan, dengan mengecualikan hak-hak yang lain, iaitu perayu (dan juga responden ketiga dan keempat), melanggar prinsip "the right of the other partners to have the goodwill sold for the common benefit of all".

(5) Sehingga dan kecuali proses penggulungan urusan perkongsian diselesaikan, tidak ada seorang pun rakan kongsi yang berhak menggunakan nama perkongsian terdahulu mereka.

Case(s) referred to:

Burchell v. Wilde [1900] 1 Ch 551 (refd)

Chia Foon Tau & Anor v. Lim Pey Lin [1997] 4 CLJ Supp 211 HC (refd)

Dato' Gopal Sri Ram v. Dato' C Vijaya Kumar & Ors [2006] 6 MLJ 328 (refd)

Ng Teck Sim Colin v. Teh Guek Ngor Engelin & Anor [1995] 2 SLR 380 (refd)

Morgan v. Forster [1976] 12 OR (2nd) 352 (refd)

Sukhinderjit Singh Muker v. Arumugam Deva Rajah [1998] 2 CLJ Supp 110 HC (refd)

Legislation referred to:

Legal Profession Act 1976, s. 85

Partnership Act 1961, s. 40

Counsel:

For the appellant - Ambiga Sreenevasan (Conrad Young with her); M/s Sreenevasan Young

For the 1st & 2nd respondent - Gideon Tan; M/s Gideon Tan Razali Zaini

For the 3rd respondent - Mohd Arief Emran Arifin; M/s Gideon Tan Razali Zaini

[Appeal from High Court, Kuala Lumpur; Originating Summons No: S-24 NCVC-742-2010]

Reported by Amutha Suppayah

The plaintiffs' counsel made an oral preliminary objection ('the PO') under O. 33 r. 2 of the Rules of Court 2012 ('ROC') on the first day of a full trial. She submitted that the defendant's counsel had failed to comply with the case management directions ('CM') given by the court on 17 August 2012 wherein the court had given an unless order for the trial documents to be filed, including the statement of agreed facts ('SOAF') and issues to be tried ('ITBT') by 8 October 2012. On 25 September 2012, counsel for the plaintiffs enclosed the SOAF and ITBT to counsel for the defendant and requested him to revert to them within seven days, failing which, the plaintiffs would proceed to obtain judgment against the defendant. Counsel for the defendant failed to revert to them, thus the plaintiffs' counsel filed the SOAF and ITBT on 8 October 2012 in compliance with the court order. On 18 March 2013, which was the last date of the CM, both counsel were informed by the court that witness statements of both parties and the defendant's summary of case had to be e-filed by 19 March 2013 since the court only recognised documents which were e-filed and they formed the official file of the court. Another unless order was given for such filing to ensure strict compliance by both parties. Counsel for the plaintiffs submitted that the court's unless order was justified and that the plaintiffs had filed their own version of the SOAF and ITBT and until the date of trial, counsel for the defendant did not revert to them on those documents. Counsel for the defendant, however, submitted that on the morning of the trial, the court interpreter had requested him to sign the court's physical copies of the plaintiffs' SOAF and ITBT, which he did.

Held (judgment for plaintiffs):

(1) The unless order given on 17 August 2012 for the trial documents to be filed by 8 October 2012 was a peremptory order which must be complied with promptly and strictly by both parties. This is a new civil court ie, an NCvC established for the purpose of expediting the trial of cases and completing them within nine months, if possible, from the time of registration of the case. As such, it is crucial that all orders given during CM be complied with by both parties according to the timelines given by the court. (para 22)

(2) The signing by counsel for the defendant on the physical copies of the SOAF and ITBT in the judge's personal physical file of the cause papers did not constitute official e-filing of the documents and ought to be rejected. The judge's physical file is only for the judge's own quick reference and reading and it is usually used as a back-up file should the e-system ie, the electronic Case Management System ('CMS') of the court be suddenly slow or breaks down. From the last CM on 18 March 2013, counsel for the defendant should already know, in case he pleads ignorance, that the trial documents must be e-filed and the court rejects documents filed manually, including documents signed on physical copies, but not e-filed through the CMS. (para 24)

(3) By the fact that the defendant's counsel did not sign and then e-filed afresh the SOAF and ITBT (filed previously by counsel for the plaintiffs), on record, there was no statement of agreed facts and no issues to be tried which had been agreed by both parties. Counsel for the defendant did not comply with the filing of these two documents which were required to be filed in accordance with O. 34 r. 2(2)(j) and (k) of the ROC for pre-trial case management. The defendant's counsel did not give heed to the court's order or render cooperation to the plaintiff's counsel and also to the court to ensure that, for the purpose of a just, expeditious and economical trial as intended by O. 34 of the ROC on pre-trial case management, at least there must be some agreed facts, so that not all the facts need to be disputed, and for the agreed issues for trial to be identified in order to set parameters for the trial. Thus, by the defendant's failure to revert to counsel for the plaintiffs or agree to the SOAF and ITBT filed by them, it further meant that the defendant did not agree to any fact and was therefore disputing every fact, and also did not have any issue to be tried. (para 24)

(4) Based on the considerations of established principles, and in exercise of the court's powers under O. 33 r. 5 and O. 34 r. 1(3) of the ROC, the defendant was precluded from defending the case. Since the defendant had not deemed it fit to raise any issues to be tried, the defendant's defence was further struck out. Accordingly, the plaintiffs' PO was allowed and judgment was given to the plaintiffs as prayed in the writ of summons and statement of claim. (para 30)

Case(s) referred to:

Anwar Ibrahim v. Abdul Khalid & Anor [2004] 8 CLJ 14 HC (refd)

Md Amin Md Yusof & Anor v. Cityvilla Sdn Bhd [2004] 3 CLJ 88 CA (refd)

Sunway PMI-Pile Construction Sdn Bhd v. Pembenaan Chan & Chua Sdn Bhd [2003] 5 CLJ 63 HC (refd)

Legislation referred to:

Rules of Court 2012, O. 33 rr. 2, 5, O. 34 rr. 1(1), (2), (3), 2(2)(j), (k)

Counsel:

For the plaintiffs - Harwinder Kaur; M/s A J Ariffin, Yeo & Harpal

For the defendant - Andrew Davis; M/s Andrew Davis & Co

Reported by Suhainah Wahiduddin

Tertuduh ('OKT') menghadapi dua pertuduhan di bawah s. 17(a) Akta Suruhanjaya Pencegahan Rasuah Malaysia 2009 ('Akta'), kerana menerima secara rasuah wang suapan yang masing-masing berjumlah RM1,500 dan RM2,000 sebagai dorongan supaya tidak melaporkan kepada ibu pejabat Petronas Dagangan Berhad ('PDB') bahawa "compact valve" yang dibekalkan oleh syarikat Dual Metal Sdn Bhd ('Dual Metal') kepada Terminal LPG Melaka telah bocor. OKT adalah kakitangan PDB yang bertugas sebagai "superintendant" di Terminal LPG Melaka. Satu kontrak telah diberikan kepada Dual Metal oleh PDB untuk membekalkan "compact valve" baru kepada terminal LPG milikan PDB. Pengadu ('SP3') menyatakan bahawa beliau dimaklumkan oleh OKT, pada dua tarikh yang berasingan, bahawa injap yang dibekalkan oleh syarikatnya, Dual Metal, dijumpai bocor dan meminta SP3 memasukkan wang sebanyak RM1,500 dan RM2,000 ke dalam akaun OKT bagi menanggung kos pembaikan tersebut dan menangguhkan daripada membuat laporan kepada ibu pejabat PDB. SP3 telah memasukkan wang tersebut ke dalam akaun OKT. Pihak pendakwaan berjaya membuktikan kes prima facie atas kedua-dua pertuduhan tersebut dan dengan itu, OKT dipanggil untuk membela diri atas kedua-dua pertuduhan tersebut. OKT di dalam pembelaannya mengakui menerima wang sebanyak RM1,500 dan RM2,000 daripada SP3 dan menyatakan bahawa wang tersebut diberikan oleh SP3 untuk membelanja kakitangan OKT makan sebagai balasan tidak melaporkan kepada pihak pengurusan tentang kebocoran "compact valve" yang dibekalkan oleh syarikat SP3. Walau bagimanapun, OKT menafikan bahawa beliau meminta wang tersebut daripada SP3. Isu yang perlu diputuskan oleh mahkamah adalah sama ada keterangan yang dikemukakan oleh pihak pembelaan cukup bagi mematahkan anggapan yang terkandung di dalam s. 50(1) Akta.

Diputuskan (mensabitkan dan menghukum OKT):

(1) Di atas fakta, OKT telah memperoleh wang berjumlah RM1,500 dan RM2,000 dan mengakui telah membelanjakan wang tersebut untuk membeli makanan dan minuman untuk kakitangan beliau. Di bawah s. 19(1)(c) Akta, OKT adalah bersalah terhadap tuduhan di bawah s. 17(a) Akta sebaik sahaja dibuktikan bahawa beliau telah secara rasuah memperoleh wang yang diberikan oleh SP3 untuk tidak melaporkan tentang kebocoran pada "compact valve" tersebut, walaupun pada hakikatnya beliau tidak melakukan apa yang diminta oleh SP3. (perenggan 16)

(2) Tujuan OKT memaklumkan tentang kebocoran "compact valve" kepada SP3 adalah bagi menakutkan SP3 sehingga mendorong SP3 untuk membayar wang kepada OKT sebagai balasan tidak melaporkan tentang kebocoran tersebut kepada pihak pengurusan PDB. Keterangan SP3 ini gagal dipatahkan oleh pihak pembelaan. Pihak pembelaan dengan itu gagal mematahkan anggapan di bawah s. 50(1) Akta dengan membuktikan di atas imbangan kebarangkalian bahawa wang yang OKT peroleh itu bukanlah wang rasuah. Pendakwaan berjaya membuktikan bahawa kedua-dua tuduhan terhadap OKT melampaui keraguan yang munasabah. (perenggan 17 & 18)

(3) Dalam rayuan mitigasinya, OKT membangkitkan tentang kesusahan yang dialaminya akibat daripada kejadian dalam kes ini, termasuk diberhentikan kerja oleh PDB. Mengambilkira kepentingan OKT dan kepentingan awam, OKT wajar dijatuhkan hukuman penjara dua tahun dan denda RM15,000 iaitu sepuluh kali ganda jumlah suapan bagi pertuduhan pertama dan penjara dua tahun dan denda RM20,000 iaitu sepuluh kali ganda nilai suapan bagi pertuduhan kedua. Kedua-dua hukuman penjara diperintahkan berjalan secara berturutan kerana kedua-dua tuduhan telah berlaku dalam dua transaksi yang berasingan. (perenggan 19)

Kes-kes yang dirujuk:

Balachandran v. PP [2005] 1 CLJ 85 FC (dirujuk)

PP v. Datuk Haji Harun Haji Idris [1976] 1 LNS 97 HC (dirujuk)

PP v. Yap Huat Heng [1986] 1 CLJ 81; [1986] CLJ (Rep) 645 (dirujuk)

Thavanathan Balasubramaniam v. PP [1997] 3 CLJ 150 FC (dirujuk)

Perundangan yang dirujuk:

Malaysian Anti-Corruption Commission Act 2009, ss. 3, 17(a), 19(1)(c), 24(1), 50(1)

Kaunsel:

Bagi pihak pendakwaan - Ahmad Sazilee Abdul Khairi; TPR

Bagi pihak tertuduh - Mohd Zaharudeen Harun (Khairul Nizam Mohd Masnan bersamanya); T/n Dzulkifli Jaafar Nizam & Co

Dilaporkan oleh S Barathi